Learning From The Best: Big Pots Out of Position

In the last post of this newsletter, we saw how the difference between the top 4 best players in the world and their nosebleed peers could be isolated down to an incredible performance at big pots out of position. This discrepancy was evidenced by the 2 graphs below:

While the 'normal' guys out there were losing at -115 EV bb/100, the top 4 were destroying everyone with a +250 EV bb/100 in the exact same scenario.

Sure, the sample is fairly small and it's very possible that the actual distance between the 2 groups is not as big. That being said, the difference in redline is striking, and it points to something that no graph or stat can explain: the eagerness to fight for pots.

That's why we finished the last post with the idea of reviewing a hand that could demonstrate in practice what the above graphs reveal - how a top crusher approaches big pots OOP differently than everyone else.

And I've got just the hand for that.

The hand starts with PR0DIGY opening from the HJ with JThh. Schyllae 3bets from the Button, PR0DIGY calls, and they see a flop HU.

Preflop is standard, at least in this circumstance. It's important to remember that this game was rake free, so even though JTs might be a mixed strategy call on high rake environments, it's a pure continue on a chipEV sim. On the flop, PR0DIGY checks to the aggressor, expecting a high frequency cbet on a High card board. In fact, if playing with a 1-size strategy on the flop, the BTN should cbet its entire range for a small sizing on this board:

PR0DIGY calls and they see a turn.

Schyllae double barrels and PR0DIGY folds. A 12.27 BBs loss goes directly to PR0DIGY's red line, as he folds a middle pair hand on a draw completing turn.

Standard, right?

Well, yes - but also no.

This is exactly how 99% of players would've played this hand. They would've most likely lost 12BBs of redline, or got to showdown with low equity. And it's a demonstration of the reason why players like PR0DIGY are winning so much more big pots out of position than everyone else: he didn't play it like that.

This is what happened instead:

PR0DIGY check-raised the flop with his 2nd pair.

Why did he make this play?

The answer can be constructed in multiple levels. The first and more obvious one is that this is a correct play in theory, and he knows it.

JhTh should check-raise the flop 23% of the time. The reason for this is that the OOP player needs board coverage. This is a concept in No Limit Hold'em that loosely describes the necessity that a balanced range has to at least be able to hit most board textures and runouts. It's often used in the context of preflop play, where we see solver mixing calls and 3bets with various types of holdings, with the underlying assumed idea that this is a necessary condition to not be exploitable on the boards where those hands hit. If you don't mix it up with those hands preflop, then you can never have certain nutted hands postflop, and thus you would be exploitable.

The idea behind raising 2nd pair, however, is more in the direction of bluff coverage, rather than the typical value coverage rationalization. This board is very draw heavy and it's broadway heavy. If PR0DIGY raises AK or better for value, and then uses draws as a bluff, then what happens when the draws complete? Suddenly he will have no bluffs left in his range, and his opponents will be able to exploit him if he bets by overfolding.

This is what happens, for example, when the river completes a flush after a double flushdraw turn, when the IP player triple barrels in a single raised pot. The data below shows how bluffing river for a 75% betsize as the IP player profits on average 25% of the pot, well above the line's average (19%).

Bluffing is profitable when the draws complete because everyone overfolds when the draws complete. But if you don't have any bluffs in your range, you're getting exploited and your strategy needs an upgrade. You need a new bluff heuristic to fill in that gap.

Using pairs as a check-raise facing cbets is a major part of GTO strategy in poker. These types of hands are great candidates to include in your bluff range construction because they have nice blockers to your opponents' 2pairs and sets, and they still have some equity to improve against one pair hands they're currently behind.

From my GTO Blueprint Course, this is the gameplan I give in the 3BP OOP PFC module, for the Facing Small Flop Cbet video:

For this course, I researched thousands of board textures and compiled the aggregated action frequencies per hand class (rounded to multiples of 20% for simpler execution) that GTO uses in every relevant flop and turn line. This allows a player to have a super high level gameplan while having an easy implementation at the same time, as they'll know exactly how to play any hand in their range with a balanced construction, without any cognitive dissonances or complicated rationalizations - the frequencies are there, the work is to simply learn them and execute them.

In PR0DIGY's hand, Tx hands (2nd pair) should be check-raised 23.7% of the time on the aggregate, which matches our 20% Bucket from the blueprint:

The next angle this raise can be perceived from is the exploitative angle.

If the BTN player is cbetting any 2 cards on this board (as he should), then defending against a check-raise becomes more difficult, compared to playing a strategy where he checks back middling and weak hands.

This difficulty is evidenced by the fact that, while GTO only folds 32% of the time facing a check-raise on this flop, players on average fold 43% of the time on double broadway two tone boards (according to my Database of 400 million online poker hands).

But the bulk of the exploitation doesn't come from the flop itself. It's from what comes next.

The turn comes the 6c, a card that completes flush draws and 98s. PR0DIGY bets 25% pot.

This is an amazing card for OOP in theory. 55% equity, over 60% of pot share in EV, and a significant nut advantage (19% straights/flushes for OOP, only 11% for IP). This huge range strength discrepancy leads to OOP betting entire range on the turn:

The best part, however, is that this is a turn card that gets massively overfolded in practice. And the reason is what we discussed earlier: on a card that completes all the draws, how is your opponent going to believe you hold a bluffing hand? What is he supposed to do with all the now super weak one pair hands he has?

While GTO folds only 18% of its range on the turn facing a small bet, population folds an incredible 39% of the time on flush completing cards in this line. That's one of the biggest overfolds I've ever seen for a turn spot - and I've been studying population tendencies for almost a decade.

Schyllae is stubborn, however. He wants to see a river.

Schyllae makes the call, and the river is a super blank, the 3h. What would you do now in PR0DIGY's shoes?

This is a very uncomfortable situation for the OOP player. We check-raised the flop, continued betting on the turn on a great card for our range, but our opponent still decided to call, showing a lot of interest in the pot. Psychologically, if you're not really sure of what you're doing, a feeling of doubt about your play may start to rise at this very moment on the river. 'What if this is just a mega punt?'; 'Am I getting too out of line here?'. Some people may even start anticipating the terrible feeling of bluffing and getting snapped by a bluffcatcher. The idea of losing the entire stack on a huge bluff is frightening.

Not for a nosebleeds crusher though.

PR0DIGY jams the river, Schyllae finally folds, and PR0DIGY takes a 78.8 bb pot - 39.4 big blinds straight to his redline.

I find this hand amazing because it demonstrates exactly why these players are crushing OOP spots so much more than the other players. In a single hand, PR0DIGY demonstrated:

• The theory knowledge required to take a 2nd pair hand and turn it into a flop check-raise bluff, a play that 99% of players won't do enough;

• Theory knowledge of how the 3rd to flush is a great card for his range, and at the same time a great card to be aggressive, given the huge population overfold;

• The fearlessness to stick with the bluff in a huge pot, despite the opponent demonstrating interest in the pot after his super strong line.

It's this type of play that generates real edge. It's making these types of plays where everyone else just check-calls and folds later that can make a difference - not just to your redline, but to your overall winrate.

This hand demonstrates, on top of everything I already mentioned, a very unique characteristic of these redline players, which I have observed in all of the Top 4 we talked about last week: they are capable of turning showdown value hands into a bluff, especially in spots where it's not natural for most people to do it. These players are clearly not bound by the limits of theory. A solver that says 'this hand should always just call' or 'this is not a bluff candidate' doesn't stop them from making a play, if they think it's the best play.

Take a look at this other hand from PR0DIGY:

Solver says donk jamming JJ no spade is not a thing on this runout - and PR0DIGY knows this. He has JJ with a spade to do this with. TT with a spade to do this with. JJ no spade is a major overbluff - and he is playing against one of the best players of all time, Linus Loeliger. But he doesn't care. He believes his opponent will overfold, and he goes for the play anyway.

In the modern era of the game, it's very easy to fall into 2 major traps:

• Play too much theory oriented because that's all you study

• Play too much theory oriented because you give too much credit to everyone else

PR0DIGY - and all the other redline players that crushed the World Championship challenge - know theory very well. It's impossible to get to this level without knowing the theory very well. But they don't have a 'let's play defensive' mentality. They are not trying to be balanced in every spot. They are capable of playing lines that most people are not playing - and they do so while exploiting the best players in the world. And the beautiful thing about their exploitation is that it's precisely targeted to attack situations where they are perceived as super strong. These redline players are masters of overbluffing in spots where everyone overfolds, making their aggression super hard and uncomfortable to counter. They are not blasting off in obvious spots where their range is clearly too weak or unprotected. They are blasting off in spots where even the most calling station player will think twice before calling down, because finding the bluffs is too hard.

If you want to get a better redline and dramatically improve your results, you need, above all technical ability, to change your mentality. Really crushing this game is only possible if you're ready to take risks the other players are not taking. It requires approaching every hand with a mind that wants to find any excuse possible to continue fighting for the pot, instead of looking for reasons to give up. It requires finding situations where most people are imbalanced towards value - and blasting off bluffs exactly in those spots.

Thank you for reading, my friend! See you next time.

Saulo